In Crawford and Sobel [1982] (CS), a sender (S) uses cheap talk to persuade a receiver (R) to select an action as profitable to S as possible. In this paper, we prove that the presence of an outside option-R can avoid taking any action, yielding state-independent reservation utilities to R and S-has an important qualitative impact on the results. Contrary to CS, in our model, the maximum size of the information partition is not always decreasing in the level of conflict of interest. Second, communication may be more informative than in CS.
Introduction
Since the celebrated work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , hereafter CS, cheap talk has been studied extensively. In this paper, we add an additional element to the existing conflicts of interest between a sender (S) and a receiver (R): R may avoid taking any action where S and R have different state-independent reservation utilities from inaction. Inaction can be interpreted as an outside option. We show that the results of our model are quite different from those of CS. An important insight of CS is that as the level of conflict of interest between R and S increases, the informativeness of communication decreases; this is not true in our environment. In our model, communication may become more informative as the conflict of interest between R and S increases.
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where R may avoid taking any action. Consider, for instance, the case of an expert in an organization who makes a proposal to senior management on important issues like business strategy. Clearly, the senior management can implement a modified version of the proposal, accept the proposal, or ignore the proposal and continue with business as usual. Thus, the assumption that R must take an action may be unrealistic. Of course, if this assumption does not have significant impact on the results, this simplification poses no problems. But the results of this paper suggest otherwise. CS predicts that, when conflicts of interest are large, little information is transmitted. Thus, in organizations, management should always employ people whose biases are as low as possible. 1 However, this conclusion is not valid in our model.
As in CS, there is a state of the world θ 2 [0, 1] that is unknown to R but observed by S. R's payoffs are maximized by action a = θ, while S's payoffs are maximized by action a = θ + b, where b > 0 represents the level of conflict of interest over actions between the two. In equilibrium, S partitions his information and reports only which element of the partition his information lies in.
To see the intuition for our result that conflict of interest sometimes facilitates communication, contrast the case when R always selects an action with the case when R may select inaction. First consider the case when inaction is not profitable for R; so R always selects an action as in CS. We know from CS that equilibria are of "partition" form. Suppose the partition is [0, x] and [x, 1] , where x 2 [0, 1], i.e., S sends a low message if θ 2 [0, x] and a high message if θ 2 [x, 1] . When this is an equilibrium, S is indifferent between R's response to a low message and to a high message when the true state is the boundary point θ = x. If b increases, this may not remain an equilibrium. As S becomes more biased, it is more difficult for S to make an honest report: S may want to deviate and send a high message when the state is low.
Now consider the case when inaction is a realistic option for R. We show that in equilibrium R selects inaction when S sends a high message and an action when S sends a low message. Suppose inaction gives S a very low payoff. Now there is a new form of potential deviation that we must concern ourselves with. S may want to deviate and send a low message when the state is high so as to induce an action. Even if b is small enough that R and S have informative communication in CS, they may not be able to do so in our model.
On the other hand, as b increases, R's selection of an action in response to the low message is too low compared to what S wants in a high state; S is more willing to send a message honestly when the state is high. Even if b is large enough that R and S can not have informative communication in CS, they may be able to have informative communication in our model. Therefore, when an outside option is a realistic option for R, conflict of interest can sometimes facilitate communication.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the basic model. Section 4 provides a characterization of equilibria. Section 5 deals with comparative statics. Section 6 provides a welfare analysis of the model and section 7 concludes. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
Related Literature
With an outside option, our model is similar to multi-dimensional in a sense that R chooses among actions but R also chooses between action and inaction. Thus, this paper has similarity to cheap talk papers that consider multidimensionality. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) analyzes a cheap talk communication game between one receiver and one sender. However, in their model states and actions are multidimensional, while in CS states and actions are uni-dimensional. Their main purpose is to show that this multidimensionality allows more information transmission compare to CS. For example, in CS, when the level of conflict interest is very high, there is no information transmission. However, there exists an informative equilibrium where S reports a comparative ranking over actions such as "action 1 is better than action 2". However, the main result of CS that S reveals less information as the level of conflict of interests increases remains unchanged.
Che, Dessein and Kartik (2010) studies a cheap talk model allowing R to take inaction, as in our paper. Unlike us, their paper uses a discrete state space and assumes R and S have identical preferences over actions. A central result is that even though R and S have identical preferences, the information transmission might be less than that in CS.
The idea that a speaker can transmit information to a receiver by sending costless signals and that the receiver must choose an action has been examined and applied in many different environments: when there are multiple senders and one receiver; 2 and when there is one sender and multiple receivers. 3 From an applied stand point, cheap talk has been used to understand fields as diverse as finance, politics and wars. 4 
Model
Let a 2 R [ f?g denote a set of alternative decisions for a sender (S). Nature chooses θ-the true state of the world-according to a uniform distribution with support [0,1]. A receiver (R) makes a decision without knowledge of the true state; S observes the true realization θ of nature and reports the state of the world by using a cheap talk message m 2 [0, 1] to R.
Each player has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U l : R [ f?g [0, 1] ! R, which maps R's decision a and the true state θ to the outcome. We use the structure of CS's leading example. S has an ideal point θ + b, where b > 0, if an action a 2 R is taken and a reservation utility is w, where w > 0, if inaction a = ? is selected. R has an ideal point θ if an action a 2 R is taken and a reservation utility u, where u > 0, if inaction a = ? is selected. R's payoffs are given by:
S's payoffs are given by:
Utility functions are common knowledge. The timing of a game is as follows: (a) at time zero, nature chooses the state of the world θ according to a uniform distribution with support [0,1], S observes the true state of the world θ; (b) at time one, S reports the state of the nature using a cheap talk message m 2 [0, 1] to R; (c) R decides whether to take an action a 2 R or not a = ? and the outcome is realized. A strategy for R is a function a : [ 1] , that associates the true state θ with his message m. The solution concept we will use is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
In the example we presented in the introduction, the senior management is R and the expert is S. The senior management decides whether the firm starts a new business or continues with business as usual and asks the expert for advice. To maximize the firm's profit, a more "advanced" business should be introduced in higher states. The expert has been at the position with experience. The state is known to the expert. The senior management wants to maximize the firm's profit. That is his only goal. However, the expert's benefit is not only from the firm's profit. The expert also benefits from introducing a more advanced business. Thus, the expert is biased toward more advanced business than the senior management.
Equilibria
In this section, we will provide a full characterization of the equilibria in our model. As in CS, every equilibrium in our model is given by a finite information partition.
Let a l (θ) denote an optimal action of player l = R, S given θ, so a R (θ) = θ and a S (θ) = θ + b. Let a (m) denote R's equilibrium action given message m.
Let θ (N) (θ 1 (N) , ..., θ N (N)) denote an information partition of [0, 1] , with N steps where 0
) denote the i-th element of information partition θ (N). An information partition equilibrium of size N is an equilibrium in which S only reveals which element of a partition θ (N) his information lies. For example, given θ 2 (θ i 1 (N) , θ i (N)), S only reveals R that the true state is in θ 2 (θ i 1 (N) , θ i (N)), but S does not reveal the true state θ.
Lemma 1 Every equilibrium is a partition equilibrium of finite size. Further, if S induces R to select inaction in an partition equilibrium of size N, inaction is induced only if θ 2 ( θ N 1 (N) , θ N (N) ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Similar to CS, Lemma 1 states that in our model, every equilibrium consists of a finite information partition and a finite number of actions are induced. Furthermore, when inaction is induced in equilibrium, it occurs only when the true state is in the last element of the information partition. In the example we presented in the introduction, when inaction or business as usual is profitable for the senior management (R), R does not want to start an extremely advanced business. R decides to continue with business as usual if the expert (S) reports that the state is very high.
Lemma 1 implies that there may exist two types of partition equilibria in our model. The first type of partition equilibria are ones where an action is always taken ("ACT equilibria"). The second type of partition equilibria are ones where sometimes the outside option or inaction is chosen ("STOP equilibria"). Every equilibrium which exists in CS is an ACT equilibrium because inaction is not an option in CS.
It is easy to see that in an ACT equilibrium of size N, the partition must satisfy the usual indifference conditions for S:
Also, R's action must be given by:
Finally, to ensure that R does not choose inaction, we require:
S sends a message m 2 ( 
Note that R prefers an action to inaction when the element of the information partition in which S reveals to R is narrow enough and the revealed information is precise enough that R expects a high payoff from his optimal action as compared to the payoffs from inaction. Communication is informative when S uses a fine information partition. On the other hand, since R and S have conflicts of interests over actions and S prefers a higher action than R actually wants, S has an incentive to declare a higher state than the true state. In order for S to be willing to tell the truth, any rightward element of the information partition must be wider compared to its adjacent leftward element. Suppose the state is on the boundary of two elements of the partition. S has an incentive to declare he is in the rightward element. In order to prevent S from doing this, R must take a higher action in the rightward element than S wants. R takes a higher action in the rightward element as the rightward element becomes wider. The rightward element must be wider than the leftward element, and should be wider as S is more biased or b increases. Thus, for S to reveal the true element of the partition, every message sent by S contains different levels of informativeness. Figure 1 shows examples of information partitions.
In a STOP equilibrium of size
The indifference conditions for S change to:
and:
The conditions defining R's optimal action are now:
and
Finally, we must have:
S's indifference condition at boundary point θ i (N) again implies:
S's indifference condition at boundary point θ N 1 (N) implies:
(11) and (12) imply: Figure 2 shows an example of S's indifference conditions and R's constraints.
Why does R sometimes take an action and sometimes select inaction? For S to reveal the true element of the partition, the rightward element must be wider than the element to its immediate left. Thus, every message sent by S contains a different level of informativeness. For any reservation utility for R, a message claiming higher states is less likely to convince R to take an action compared to a message claiming lower states. Now, we characterize the set of equilibria. For u > 1 12 , the game is equivalent to CS: all equilibria in CS, which are ACT equilibria, exist and they are the only equilibria in our model. , from S's indifference condition given by (6), for each b > 0, the maximum size of information partition, N (b), is well defined by:
where
, inaction is profitable for R; an ACT equilibrium exists only if S reveals enough information. This implies that there is a lower bound for the size of the information partition for an ACT equilibrium to exist, in addition to the usual upper bound. 
Proof. See Appendix.
It is not hard to show that there exists a STOP equilibrium of size N only if b 2 B (N), where:
for an integer N 2. (17) The maximum size among STOP equilibria, N STOP (b), is given by:
In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that B (1) B (2) ... B (N). That is, when there exists an STOP equilibrium of size N 0 , there will also exists a STOP equilibrium of every size N 2 f1, 2, ..., N 0 g. Because S and R have conflicting interests over actions, the informativeness of communication is limited in STOP equilibria, i.e., there is an upper bound N STOP (b) of the size of the information partition in STOP equilibria. On the other hand, there is no lower bound for an information partition size in STOP equilibria. In a STOP equilibrium with coarser information partitions, R has less confidence that his own action selection is profitable and selects inaction more frequently.
An example showing how STOP equilibria vary with b is given in Figure 4 .
We fully characterized PBE in our model. For u > 
Comparative Statics
In this section, we will present two major results. First, in CS, the maximum size of equilibrium is always decreasing in the bias of S, b. However, in our model, this is not always the case. Second, we will show that the most informative equilibrium in our model can give more or less information than CS's most informative equilibrium. In the next section, we discuss the welfare implication of these results.
Non-Monotonicity
First, we show that the maximum equilibrium partition size, N(b), is not monotonic in the level of conflict of interest over actions, b. More specifically, whenever ACT equilibria exist, N(b) is monotonically decreasing in b. However, when only STOP equilibria exist, monotonicity may be violated.
We will now construct a function h(u) such that the maximum partition size is not monotonic in b if and only if w > h(u), where h (u) is well defined over 0, 1 12 i and is increasing in u. 7 How does conflict of interest between R and S facilitate communication? Consider the case where the state is on the boundary of two adjacent elements of the 7 See Appendix for a mathematical expression of h ( ).
information partition. Assume that in the leftward element R will take an action and in the rightward element R will take inaction. In order for S to be willing to tell the truth, S must be indifferent between R's selection of an action in the leftward element and inaction. This implies that the left element of the information partition should be sufficiently wide. As the level of conflict of interest decreases, R's selection of an action is more profitable in the left element of the partition. Thus, to maintain S's indifference, the left element should be wider for a lower level of conflict of interest. But this could induce R to deviate to inaction in the left element or action in the right, breaking the equilibrium.
To illustrate the theorem, consider the following example. Let u = 
The Maximum Partition Size
Finally, we will compare the maximum partition size in our model with that in CS. We will show the maximum partition size in our model, N (b), is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller than that in CS, N ACT (b).
Lemma 6 implies that the maximum partition size in our model could be larger than that in CS by at most one. Proof. See Appendix.
We now explain why in equilibrium the maximum partition size in our model is sometimes larger than the maximum partition size in CS. Given the level of conflict of interest over actions b, the maximum partition size in CS is equivalent to N ACT (b). Consider any equilibrium of the maximum size in CS. Suppose the true state is on the boundary point between the most rightward element and its adjacent left element. For S to tell the truth, S must be indifferent between R's action in the right element and R's action in the left element. Because S always prefers a higher action compared to R, S has an incentive to lie and declare higher states. Hence indifference implies that the right element is larger than its leftward neighbor; the difference in width between the two elements must increase as b increases. This defines the maximum partition size.
On the other hand, consider a STOP equilibrium given the same b. Suppose the true state is on the boundary point between the most rightward element and its adjacent leftward element of the information partition. The most rightward element is larger than its leftward element so that R takes inaction in the most rightward element and an action in the neighbor to the left. Because inaction is taken on the most right element by R, the width of this element is irrelevant for S's payoff. Thus, the maximum partition size of a STOP equilibrium in our model can be larger than the maximum partition size in CS.
For visual clarity, we define three sets of (u, w) pairs, LA (b), EQ (b) and SM(b), such that:
The maximum partition size in our model is larger than, equal to and smaller than the maximum size in
Remind in CS, for any integer k 1, there exist l k and u k such that 0 < l k < u k = l k+1 and the maximum partition size 
To illustrate Proposition 7, consider the following two cases where (i) b 2 Figure 11 and 12 illustrate the equilibrium outcomes for cases (i) and (ii) respectively. In both figures,
If u is small and w is medium, R and S can have more informative communication than in CS model.
Welfare

The Best Equilibrium
In CS, both R and S always strictly prefer equilibrium information partitions with more steps, i.e., larger N. (See CS's Theorem 3 and Theorem 5.) In this section, we will show that R always strictly prefer equilibrium information partitions with more steps, but S may not.
Let U STOP l (N) denote the ex-ante expected payoffs of player l = R, S and θ STOP i (N) denote the i-th boundary point in an STOP equilibrium of partition size N. So:
where:
Let U ACT l (N) denote the ex-ante expected payoffs of player l = R, S and and θ ACT i (N) denote the i-th boundary point in an ACT equilibrium of partition size N. So:
Holding fixed the type of equilibrium, every player's ex-ante expected payoffs are increasing in the informativeness of communication. Thus, given the type of equilibrium, every player prefers an equilibrium with a finer information partition.
Lemma 8 Fix any b, u and w. Then,
(1) Each player l=R,S always strictly prefers an ACT equilibrium with more steps to an ACT equilibrium with fewer steps.
(2) Each player l=R,S always strictly prefers a STOP equilibrium with more steps to a STOP equilibrium with fewer steps.
Proof. See Appendix.
We consider "the best equilibrium" for player l = R, S where the player's ex-ante expected payoffs across all states is maximized.
R's ex-ante expected payoffs are maximized in whichever equilibrium has the maximum partition size.
Proposition 9
Fix any b, u and w. The best equilibrium for R is an equilibrium of the maximum size. If both types of equilibria have the same maximum size, the best equilibrium for R is an ACT equilibrium of the maximum size.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in Figure 9 and 10 in Section 5.2, for u 2 C (b) , 1 12 , implying that both types of equilibria exist, the maximum size of STOP equilibria N STOP (b) is at most the maximum size of ACT equilibria N ACT (b). In this range, the best equilibrium for R is an ACT equilibrium of size N ACT (b). Figure 13 shows the type and size of the best equilibrium for R. Interestingly, the above does not hold for S. When both ACT and STOP equilibria exist and S's benefit from inaction is large (i.e., w is small), S is better off in a STOP equilibria of size N < N ACT (b) than in an ACT equilibria of size N ACT (b). Thus, unlike R, more information transmission does not always make S better off. If w is very small, the benefit from inaction exceeds the benefit from greater information transmission for S.
Proposition 10
Fix any b and u 2 0, 1 12 i . Then, there exists a cutoff w (b) > 0 such that:
(1) If w < w (b), the best equilibrium for S is a STOP equilibrium of the maximum size.
(2) If w > w (b), the best equilibrium for S is an equilibrium of the maximum size. If both types of equilibria have the same maximum size, the best equilibrium for S is an ACT equilibrium of the maximum size.
Proof. See Appendix. Figure 14 shows the type and size of the best equilibrium for S. Consider u 2 C (b) , 1 12 , implying that both types of equilibria exist. For w < w (b), S strictly prefers a STOP equilibrium of size N STOP (b) to an ACT equilibrium of size N ACT (b), where N STOP (b) < N ACT (b). For w > w (b), the result is the same as that for R.
Comparison with CS
We showed that, when an outside option is present, the players sometimes have more informative communication. How does the difference in the level of information transmission driven by the presence of an outside option affect each player's welfare? To answer this question, we will compare each player's ex-ante expected payoffs between in our model and in CS.
There are two effects to each player's payoffs driven by the presence of an outside option. The first effect is driven by the change in the level information transmission. The second effect is the direct benefit from the outside option. Thus, we compare each player's welfare in two ways. First, we give what we call an "overall comparison" where we compare each player's ex-ante expected payoffs across all states in that player's best equilibrium in each model. Next, we consider what we call a "greenlighting comparison". Define each player's "greenlighting states" to be those in which R takes an action in his best equilibrium in our model. Thus, we compare each player's ex-ante expected payoffs across his greenlighting states in his best equilibrium in each model. First, we give the results from the overall comparison. These results for R and S are given in Figure 15 and 16, respectively. In each figure, each player is better off in our model in the highlighted area and worse off in the dotted area than in CS.
R is better off in two cases. The first case is when there is more information transmission in our model than in CS, i.e., R is better off in a STOP equilibrium of size N ACT (b) + 1 in our model than in an equilibrium of size N ACT (b) in CS. The second case is when inaction is very profitable for R; here R is better off in a STOP equilibrium. On the other hand, S is better off only if w is very small and inaction is significantly profitable for S. They have more informative communication in a STOP equilibrium than in CS only if w is not too small so inaction is not very profitable for S. Thus, unlike R, the greater information transmission in a STOP equilibrium does not improve S's welfare based on the overall comparison.
Finally, we give results from the greenlighting comparison. Now, the results are very similar for both players, and are given in Figure 17 . In Figure 17 , each player is better off in our model in the highlighted area and worse off in the dotted area than in CS. The increased information transmission driven by the presence of the outside option makes both players better off across the greenlighting states.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that there are two major insights to be gained from adding inaction to cheap talk. Contrary to CS, the maximum size of the information partition is not always decreasing in the level of conflict of interest. As the level of conflict of interest between a sender and a receiver decreases, the sender's incentive to hide information may increase. Second, communication may be more informative than in CS.
In Chiba and Leong (2011), we use a simpler form of this model to explore issues such as a strategic relationship between interpersonal authority and persuasion and an effect of transparency about the sender's bias on communication.
A model of cheap talk with outside options can be used to study many different problems. Its applications span the academic, corporate and political field. 8 By using a cheap talk model that is unidimensional in both state and action space, we have shown that conflict of interest may facilitate communication when an outside option is present. On the other hand, cheap talk games that are multiple dimensional in both state and action spaces have many important applications. 9 If we add dimensions to the state and action spaces in our model, does our result-conflict of interest may facilitate communication-remain unchanged? This is an interesting open question.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the first part of Lemma 1, it suffices to show the following claim.
Claim 11 A set of actions induced in equilibrium is finite.
Suppose S does not induce R to select inaction in any state. CS's Lemma 1 holds, so the equilibrium is given by a finite information partition.
Suppose S induces R to select inaction given some state. Because, for l = R, S, U l 1 = 0 for some a, U l 11 < 0 and U l 12 > 0, and because a S (θ, b) 6 = a R (θ) for all θ, the claim in CS's Lemma 1 holds; the set of actions induced in equilibrium is finite. Thus, Claim 11 holds.
To prove the second part of Lemma 1, it is useful to show the following claim.
Claim 12 A set of states in which the same action is induced is connected.
From Claim 11, if an action is induced in equilibrium, the support of the action is bounded. Because U R a R (θ) , θ > U R (?, θ) in any state, R does not select inaction under perfect information; the support of states inducing inaction should be nondegenerate. Suppose action a is induced given θ and θ 0 , where θ < θ 0 . This reveals that S prefers action a to inaction given θ and θ 0 ; S's utilities is strictly concave in θ; S strictly prefers action a to inaction given any θ" 2 θ, θ 0 . Thus, we have
shown that a set of states in which S induces R to take the same action is connected. Thus, Claim 12 holds. Now we showed that if S induces R to select inaction in equilibrium, its support can only include a disconnected set of states or/and finite degenerate states at boundary between elements inducing actions. We will further specifies properties of equilibria where inaction is induced.
Suppose S induces inaction at boundary point θ = θ i 1 and induces an action given θ 2 (θ i 1 , θ i ), where θ i 1 < θ i . Because the set of states in which the same action is induced is connected, R takes an action
given a message m 2 (θ i 1 , θ i ). By continuity of S's utility function, S must be indifferent between inaction and action
at θ = θ i 1 ; otherwise, S deviates and induces inaction if the true state is θ = θ i 1 + ε . Because b > 0, R's response is closer to S's optimal action given θ = θ i 1 than θ = θ i , i.e.
is indifferent between inaction and action
given θ = θ i 1 , there always exists ε > 0 such that S strictly prefers inaction to action
. This is a contradiction. Hence, when S induces R to take inaction given a set of states in equilibrium, this set should include θ = 1. We have already shown that the set of states inducing inaction is nondegenerate. Thus, Lemma 1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2
From (6), the width of the i-th element is increasing in i; the wider element results in lower payoffs for R; R's expected payoffs is the lowest in the N-th element. R does not select inaction given any message if R does not given m 2 ( θ N 1 (N) , θ N (N)), i.e. (12) holds. Because of , inaction is not induced in any equilibrium; the game is equivalent to CS.
Proof of Proposition 3
We define a continuous function g (u) and a step function L (u) over 0, 1 12 i such that:
A graphical depiction of g(u) and L(u) is given in Figure 18 . As the size of partition increases, each element of the partition becomes narrower; R has a smaller incentive to select inaction. As u increases, R has a smaller incentive to select inaction. Hence, u defines a lower bound of a partition size of ACT equilibria. In an ACT equilibrium of size N, the N-th element is the widest among all elements of the partition; R does not select inaction given any message if R does not given m 2 ( θ N 1 (N) , θ N (N) ). An ACT equilibrium of size N exists only if:
From (6) , θ N (N) θ N 1 (N) is well defined. Then, (25) is simplified to:
, there does not exist an ACT equilibrium of any size.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, we show existence of N STOP (b) We first show (7) through (12) are sufficient conditions for an existence of a STOP equilibrium of size N 1. It directly follows from (9), (10) and (11) that R does not deviate given any message. Thus, it suffices to show that S does not deviate given any θ. Because of (8), for S given θ 2 [θ 0 (N) , θ N 1 (N)), inaction is dominated by at least one of induced actions in equilibrium; only S given θ 2 [θ N 1 (N) , θ N (N)] prefers inaction to any of induced actions in equilibrium. It follows from:
Thus, S does not deviate. Next, we will show existence. From Lemma 1, the information partition is finite. For u Now we will find conditions for existence of a STOP equilibrium of size N 2. Suppose a STOP equilibrium of N 2 exists. From (13) and (14), θ 1 (N) and θ N 1 (N) are well defined:
A graphical depiction of Λ (N) for N 3 is given in Figure 19 . A graphical depiction of Claim 13 is given in Figure 20 .
The definition of a set Λ (N) in (35) implies the following relation:
Hence, it suffices to show that the following relation holds for any integer N 2:
To simplify the analysis, define a set λ (N), which is a subset of Λ (N), for any integer N 2 such that: 
From the definition of λ (N), we have the following relationship:
Now we are going to show (37) by using induction. Consider (u, w) 2 Λ (2). The claim (37) holds because inf b b2B (1) = 0.
given every (u, w) 2 Λ (k) for every k 2 f2, ..., N 1g. Thus, it suffices to show: 
(45) holds because:
(46), (47) and definition of Λ (N) in (35) imply:
Hence, the claim holds for (u, w) 2 Λ (N). By induction, the claim holds for every N 2.
A graphical depiction of this proof is given by Figure 21 , 22 and 23.
Finally, we provide a definition of a cutoff C ( ):
where C ( ) is derived from g ( ):
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose u 2 0, 
Remind that
, where > 0. Thus,
+ , where > 0.
Thus, a function h (u) is defined over 0, 1 12 i :
such that:
otherwise.
(53) Figure 24 shows the relationship between h (u) and sets Λ (N), N 1:
Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose
. But, it implies:
for any θ 1 N STOP (b) >0, where:
This contradicts the definition of an equilibrium partition. There does not exist a STOP equilibrium of size N N ACT (b) + 2.
Proof of Proposition 7
We define the set Υ (N; b) such that, given b, a STOP equilibrium of size N exists only if (u, w) 2 Υ (N; b). Υ (N; b) is well defined from definitions of B ( ) and Λ ( ) because:
Thus, for any u, w and b,
Υ ( ; ) has the following properties:
Thus, Υ N ACT (b); b 6 = ? for u < 1 12 for any b:
Therefore, we have the set of equilibria as follows. for some integer k 1.
Proof of Lemma 8
First, we will show the first part of Lemma 8. From the definition, for any integer N 2:
On the other hand, an ACT equilibrium of size N exists only if b < 1  2N(N 1) . Thus, the first part of Lemma 8 holds.
Next, we will show the second part of Lemma 8. Consider u 
Cconsider R. For any integer N 2:
where the first equality follows from:
for i=2,...,N-1; the last inequality follows from: 
This inequality holds because α ( , , ) has the following properties:
Finally, consider S. w is defined by:
where T (b) is such that:
T (b) is well defined such that: In both of the overall comparison and the greenlighting comparison, we consider cases when there is difference between our model and CS, i.e., u 
Overall comparison
Proposition 9 and 10 show welfare comparison in our model; thus, we focused on u 2 C (b) , 1 12 i
. Now, we will show welfare comparison between our model and CS.
We need to consider wider range of u, i.e., we focused on u 2 0, 1 12 i . For S, welfare comparison between two types of equilibria in our model is independent of u. Thus, the result in Proposition 10 applies. For w < w , S is better off in a STOP equilibrium of size N STOP (b) in our model than in an equilibrium of size N ACT (b) in CS.
On the other hand, for R, the result in Proposition 9 only applies for u 2 C (b) , 1 12 i . We need to analyze cases when u 2 (0, C (b)]. We claim that: 
This claim follows from the following result from algebraic work:
Greenlighting comparison
First, we find the following relations: (t) = 2 p w 2b (2t 3) and:
We use these relations in the following proofs. Let N ACT (b) = k. We claim that: for l = R, S: 
It suffices to show this inequality holds for S. 
